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UNITED STATES V. SAID & UNITED STATES V. HASAN
Yes, I am a pirate two hundred years too late. The cannons don't thunder
there's nothin' to plunder ... .
During the spring of 2010, in two unrelated events, two boats off the coast of
Somalia approached United States naval vessels and opened fire.2 In both
instances, the United States Navy returned fire, gave chase, and arrested the
Somali crew members.3 Grand juries in the Eastern District of Virginia returned
separate indictments against the arrested Somalis and charged them with,
among other crimes, "[p]iracy under [the] law of nations."5 In both of these
nearly identical cases, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the piracy count
6under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Two federal district
court judges, both sitting in Norfolk, Virginia, ruled on the defendants' motions,
which alleged that the facts pleaded by the United States failed to satisfy the
elements of the piracy offense.8
Despite the similarities between the cases, the two judges reached opposite
conclusions as to whether the alleged action of the defendants-opening fire on
another vessel-constituted piracy.9 In United States v. Said,10 Judge Raymond
A. Jackson granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that their
alleged conduct could not constitute piracy.11 Less than three months later, in
United States v. Hasan,12 Judge Mark S. Davis denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss and determined that the alleged conduct could, "if proven true,"
constitute piracy.13 Said is currently on interlocutory appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.14
The distinction between the two opinions centers on the interpretation of the
phrase, "piracy as defined by the law of nations,"15 an issue that has not been
1. JIMMY BUFFETT, A Pirate Looks at Forty, on SONGS You KNOW BY HEART (MCA
Records 1985).
2. See John D. Kimball & Deepa Padmanabha, What is Piracy?, MAINBRACE, Dec. 2010, at




5. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 WL
4281892, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010); United States v. Said, No. 2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
6. See Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *2; Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *1.
7. See Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *1; Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *1.
8. See Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *3; Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *1-2.
9. Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *38; Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *11.
10. No. 2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
11. Id.at*1l.
12. No. 2:10cr56, 2010 WL 4281892 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010).
13. Id. at *38.
14. United States v. Said, No. 10-4970 (4th Cir. argued Mar. 25, 2011).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). Compare Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *37 ("[Section] 1651
requires the act to be 'piracy as defined by the law of nations,' and that definition is provided by
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addressed by the United States Supreme Court since it defined piracy as
"robbery upon the sea" in United States v. Smithl6 in 1820.17 The Constitution
explicitly grants to Congress the power to "define and punish" piracy,18 and in
1819 Congress declared that piracy was defined according to "the law of
nations."19 The "law of nations" provision of the piracy statute has remained in
the United States Code ever since. o
While the Constitution gives Congress the power to define piracy, the
judiciary has the authority to determine the weight that international customs
may be given in federal courts. 2 1  This tension between the constitutional
delegation to Congress of the power to define the crime and the federal courts'
duty to determine its contours is squarely presented in Hasan and Said. In Said,
the Fourth Circuit must ultimately determine whether federal courts can give
credence to modem international law norms regarding piracy or whether they
must limit the definition of piracy to the international law norms of the era when
Congress enacted the original version of the piracy statute.22 How the Fourth
Circuit interprets customary international law as it applies to piracy and whether
such an interpretation may include contemporary international standards will
ultimately affect whether the violent action of the defendants in Hasan and Said
constitutes piracy under United States law.
contemporary customary international law .... ), with Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *11 (defining
piracy as "sea robbery" and rejecting how "international sources treat the definition of piracy").
16. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).
17. The court in Said noted, "The Supreme Court addressed the issue of § 165 1's scope in
[United States v.] Smith. In fact, Smith is the only case to ever directly examine the definition of
piracy under § 1651." Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *4.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The only other crimes that the Constitution specifically
reserves to Congress are counterfeiting, see id. at cl. 6, and treason, see id. at art. III, § 3.
19. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (2006)) (providing for the protection of commerce and the punishment of piracy).
20. The Act was to sunset after only one year, see id. at § 6, and thus Congress passed the
Act of 1820 to extend the provisions in the 1819 Act and to include the slave trade within the
definition of piracy, see Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *11-12 (citing Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113,
§§ 2, 4-5, 3 Stat. 600-01 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006))).
21. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The federal courts may
appropriately declare whether customary international laws may be incorporated into United States
jurisprudence. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret
International Law, 118 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1762, 1816 (2009) ("U.S. courts decide cases where
international law rules or norms (or enactments derived from such rules or norms) potentially
supply rules of decision for determining the rights of litigants in cases within their jurisdiction. In
such cases, courts must expound and interpret international law, as well as its relationship with U.S.
domestic law.").
22. Brief of the United States at 15, United States v. Said, No. 10-4970 (4th Cir. argued Mar.
25, 2011).
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I. UNITED STATES V. SAID
In Said, the court concluded that the action of the Somali defendants did not
rise to the level of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and reasoned that due process
required a concrete definition of piracy grounded in Supreme Court precedent.23
Because the court was unwilling to move beyond an 1820 customary
international law definition of piracy, it concluded that piracy as defined by the
law of nations meant robbery or other depredations "committed on the high
seas." 24
When the Said defendants moved to dismiss the piracy charge,25 the United
States made two primary arguments as to why the defendants' violent action,
committed on the high seas, should constitute piracy. First, it argued that the
definition of piracy set forth in Smith-"robbery or forcible depredations
committed on the high seas"26 -was limited to the facts of that case and thus not
determinative of all potentially "piratical" acts.27 Second, it argued that
international judicial decisions, treaties, and scholarly writings include within the
definition of piracy the act of a private vessel firing a weapon at another vessel
on the high seas.28
Regarding the first contention, the court held that "the discernable definition
of piracy . . . ha[d] remained consistent and ha[d] reached a level of concrete
consensus in United S[t]ates law since its pronouncement in 1820.",29 The court
distinguished post-Smith piracy cases, reasoning that they did not expand the
statutory definition of piracy beyond the interpretation in Smith.30 Several of the
post-Smith decisions were civil forfeiture cases rather than cases involving
criminal conduct.31 Additionally, one of the cases did not address § 1651 at all
and instead based its holding on Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.32 The
court reasoned that these cases "[did] not provide concrete examples of [§] 1651
being expanded beyond the definition laid out in Smith," and thus it did not
consider them binding on its decision.33
23. See United States v. Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *10-11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
24. Id. at *8, *11.
25. Id. at *1.
26. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820).
27. Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *4.
28. Id. at *8.
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *5 (quoting and citing The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); The
Chapman, 5 F. Cas. 471 (N.D. Cal. 1864); Harmony v. United States (The Malek Adhel), 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210 (1844)).
32. Id. (quoting and citing United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008)).
33. Id. The Government also argued that "even if Smith and subsequent case law defined
piracy as 'robbery or forcible depredations,' this definition include[d] 'a variety of offense
conduct,"' such as the defendants' attack. Id. at *6. Nevertheless, the court held that "[t]he
Government's interpretation of the phrase 'forcible depredations' as something other than robbery
or plunder [was] contrary to the unambiguous definition of 'depredation."' Id. at *6.
2011] 579
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The court was also unconvinced by the international legal decisions, treaties,
and scholarly works that the United States submitted in support of its
argument.34 The court noted that the British Privy Council, the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (TNCLOS) all had adopted a definition of piracy that includes more than
robbery. Nevertheless, it also recognized that "scholars disagree on whether
there is an authoritative definition of piracy in the international community" and
many "define piracy just as Justice Story did in the Smith decision." 36 Most
importantly, the court held that "following any of these international sources as
authoritative [would be] questionable" and concluded that relying on them to
"formulat[e] [a] definition of piracy under the law of nations" would be
"contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and ... inevitably deny [the d]efendants
due process." 37
II. UNITED STATES V. HASAN
In Hasan, the court reached a conclusion opposite that of the Said court and
determined that a violent act on the high seas toward another vessel,
unsanctioned by any nation's government, is piracy under § 1651.38 In Hasan,
the court conducted a comprehensive examination of international sources and
legal actions regarding piracy, detailing America's history of defining and
punishing piracy from the founding generation to the present. By doing so, the
court persuasively reasoned that Congress intended to define piracy as something
other than just "robbery at sea." Furthermore, by highlighting the historical
rationale and international understanding behind the piracy offense, Hasan
provides a useful framework for analyzing whether allegedly piratical acts may
be defined as piracy in accordance with the "law of nations."
The court began its opinion with a historical discussion of piracy law.39
After examining the background of the "define and punish" clause in the
Constitution and concluding that it provided Congress power to "criminaliz[e]
piracy in a manner consistent with the exercise of universal jurisdiction," the
court recognized that Congress has exercised this power by enacting legislation
that "proscribe[s] piracy as both a 'municipal' crime, in violation of the laws of
the United States, and as an international crime, in violation of the law of
34. See id. at *8-10.
35. Id. at *8-9 (quoting and citing Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 15, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101,
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.)).
36. Id. at *9.
37. Id.at*10.
38. See United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 WL 4281892, at *38 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29,
2010).
39. Id. at *2-18.
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nations." 40 The court distinguished between these two types of piracy, noting
that while municipal piracy can include "virtually any overt act Congress
chooses to dub piracy," it cannot apply to acts that do not "have a jurisdictional
nexus with the United States."4  In contrast, general piracy covers acts
"irrespective of the presence of a jurisdictional nexus" but only includes
"offenses that the international community agrees [are] piracy." 42
Next, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of jurisdictional principles
as applied to international law and explained that while a State generally is
permitted to exercise jurisdiction only over acts that occur in its sovereign
territory and acts that its citizens commit in other countries, 43 under the doctrine
of universal jurisdiction a State is also permitted to "define and prescribe
punishment for any offense recognized by the community of nations as having
universal concem." 44 Although the court recognized that scholars debate the
principle of universal jurisdiction and the efficacy of applying it to modem
international law crimes, it ultimately concluded that this debate was not
applicable to piracy.4 5 Specifically, it reasoned that universal jurisdiction over
piracy "does not raise the same state sovereignty concerns implicated by
applying universal jurisdiction to modem international law offenses" because
piracy "occurs in areas to which the domestic political process of nations does
not extend, involves parties who are not acting under the authority of any nation,
and impacts every nation . . . by disrupting global commerce and imperiling
navigation." 46
The court then surveyed (1) the legislative development of piracy from
Congress's first piracy legislation, An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States,47 to the present,48 (2) United States case law prior to
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 165 1,4 (3) foreign case law dealing with the
definition of privacy in international law,50 and (4) the treatment of piracy in the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the UNCLOS.s1
40. Id. at *5 (citing Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime ofPiracy Obsolete, 38 HARV. L. REV.
334, 335-36 (1925)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761-62 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
43. Id. at *6 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401(1)-(2) (1986)).
44. Id. at *7 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1986)).
45. Id. at *9.
46. Id. at *10.
47. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113 (current version at U.S.C. § 1651
(2006)).
48. Id. at *10-13.
49. Id. at *13-15.
50. Id. at *15-17.
51. Id. at * 17-18.
2011] 58 1
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After completing its historical survey, the court turned to a determination of
the definition of piracy under the law of nations. The court examined the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Smith and noted that although the
Court defined piracy under the law of nations as "robbery upon the sea," federal
decisions since Smith have suggested a more expansive definition.52 The court
did recognize that other federal decisions have concluded that Smith's definition
is exhaustive, but ultimately concluded that determining "the contours of Smith"
was unnecessary "if the definition of piracy under the law of nations [could]
evolve over time." 53
To determine whether the definition of piracy under the law of nations was
fixed as provided in Smith, or evolving, the court examined 18 U.S.C. § 1651
and decisions of the United States Supreme Court. First, the court concluded
that by including the language "as defined by the law of nations" in § 1651,
Congress intended to "adopt a flexible-but at all times sufficiently precise-
definition of general piracy that would automatically incorporate developing
international norms. Moreover, it reasoned that allowing the definition to
adapt to changing norms was consistent with the legislative history of the
statute55 and principles of fundamental fairness.56 Second, the court examined
three Supreme Court decisions, concluding that they "demonstrate [d] that
[Congress's] use of the phrase 'law of nations' contemplate[d] a developing set
of international norms." Ultimately, the court concluded that "the phrase 'law
of nations,' as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1651, require[d] application of the modem
international consensus definition of general piracy."
To determine the definition of piracy at the time the defendants committed
the alleged offense, the court considered piracy as defined by various
international legal decisions, treaties, and scholarly works. The court's survey
included decisions by the British Privy Council, United States federal courts,
52. Id. at * 19-20 (citing Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Dole v. New Eng. Mut.
Marine Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837 (D. Mass. 1864); Chapman, 5 F. Cas. 471 (N.D. Cal. 1864)).
53. Idat*19-21.
54. Id. at *21.
55. Id. In United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), the United States
Supreme Court held that the Act of 1790 did not provide universal jurisdiction over piracy because
it "defined piracy too broadly [and] includ[ed] offenses other than robbery that were not understood
to provide a basis for invoking universal jurisdiction, such as murder and assaults against captains
by their crew." Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *22 (citing Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630-34).
One year after Palmer, Congress implicitly remedied this problem by passing the 1819 statute,
which defined piracy according to the "law of nations." Id. (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5,
3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)).
56. Hasan,2010 WL4281892,at*22-23.
57. Id. at *24-28 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); United States v.
Ariona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825)).
58. Id. at *28.
59. See id. at *33.
582 [VOL. 62: 577
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and the Government of Kenya,60 as well as treaties such as the Geneva
61Convention on the Law of the High Seas, and the UNCLOS.
In Hasan, the court used these sources to highlight the development of
international norms and standards regarding piracy and thus, unlike the court in
Said, channeled the role of scholarship as documentarian rather than as
adjudicator of a certain standard or outcome.
The court noted that the Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS have been
ratified by 63 and 161 countries respectively62sufficient for their content to be
63considered modem customary international law. The treaties contain nearly
identical definitions of privacy:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft
64
Because the two treaties contain the same definition of piracy and a high
number of signatories, the court interpreted their shared definition as customary
60. See id.
61. See id. at *31-32.
62. Id. at *32. Although the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS because of its
provisions related to deep seabed exploration and mining, it has accepted it, with the exception of
those provisions, "as customary international law, binding upon the United States." 1 THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 2-2 (4th ed. 2004). Moreover, because
customary international law is derived from the practices of the international community rather than
those of the United States alone, lack of ratification by the United States does not affect the treaty's
status as customary international law. Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *32.
63. See id. at *31-32 (citing and quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 137-39 (2010)). According to the court, "[t]he status of [the] UNCLOS as representing
customary international law is enhanced by the fact that the state[] parties to it include all of the
nations bordering the Indian Ocean on the east coast of Africa, where the incident in the [current
case allegedly took] place."
64. Geneva Convention on the Law of the Seas, art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13.2 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 11; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. While the content of the two treaties is the same, there are minor stylistic
differences. See Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at * 18.
2011] 583
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international law.65 Moreover, the court noted that United States and British
decisions as well as "recent judicial decisions from Kenya, the country currentlt
handling many modem piracy cases," reflect the UNCLOS definition of piracy.
Finally, the court recognized that contemporary scholarly writings agreed on the
67core definition of piracy as reflected in the UNCLOS. Consequently, it
adopted the UNCLOS language as the definition of general piracy under the law
of nations.68
This UNCLOS definition of piracy includes four distinct elements-(1) a
criminal act; (2) made with a particular intent; (3) in a certain space; and (4)
against a particular target.6 9  These elements clarify the scope of the piracy
offense and illustrate why piracy has traditionally been considered a universally
jurisdictional crime.
The intent element in the definition focuses on the private non-state
sanctioned intent of the party charged with piracy.70 Such a definition appears to
exempt privateers because they would be acting under the authority of a
sovereign state.
The definition also includes a geographical locus element triggering
universal jurisdiction-the high seas. This element distinguishes general
piracy from a sovereign's proscription of certain acts within its own territory that
it deems to be piracy. Additionally, by tethering the definition to the high seas,
the general piracy charge (and its accompanying universal jurisdiction) is limited
to sovereignty-threatening and commerce-frustrating activities. By clarifying
that the open seas-even though outside of the territorial sovereignty of any
nation-are not a safe haven for pirates, the definition helps to deter the
commission of piratical acts.
Finally, the definition identifies the target of piratical acts as "a ship, aircraft,
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State." 73  This
65. See id. at *32.
66. Id. at *33.
67. Id. at *34.
68. Id. at *37.
69. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64, at art. 101;
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 64, at art. 15. In Hasan, Judge Davis
analyzed the defendants' conduct using a five-part test consisting of the following elements:
(1) illegal acts of violence, (2) commited for private ends, (3) on the high seas, (4) by the
crew of a private ship, (5) and directed against another ship, or against persons on board
such ship.
Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892, at *38.
70. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64, at art. 101; Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 64, at art. 15.
71. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64 at art. 101; Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 64, at art. 15.
72. See Eugene Kontorovich, The "Define and Punish" Clause and the Limits of Universal
Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 149, 166 (2009).
73. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64, at art. 101; Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 64, at art. 15.
584 [VOL. 62: 577
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fourth element clarifies that the targets of piratical acts are physically outside of
any State's boundaries and thus deserving of universal protection.
Overall, the definition emphasizes the significance of general piracy in terms
of jurisdictional, sovereignty, and commerce-based rationales, and distinguishes
it from a simple extension of criminal robbery.
III. CONCLUSION
Subsequent to the October opinion denying the Hasan defendants' motion to
dismiss, a jury found the defendants guilty of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.74
Ultimately, in its determination of the Said appeal, the Fourth Circuit will
reconcile the Hasan and Said opinions by deciding the content and scope of
general piracy. At present, Hasan more clearly delineates the actions that
constitute piracy under current customary international law and provides a useful
framework for determining whether violent acts committed on the high seas are
in fact piracy.
William Crum McKinney
74. Verdict Form for Verdict Form for Defendant Gabul Abdullahi Ali, Hasan, 2010 WL
4281892 (No. 2:10cr 56), 2010 WL 4786990; Verdict Form for Defendant Abdi Mohammed Gurew
Ardher, Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892 (No. 2:10cr56), 2010 WL 4786992; Verdict Form for Defendant
Abdi Wali Dire, Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892 (No. 2:10cr56), 2010 WL 4786991; Defendant
Mohammed Modin Hasan, Hasan, 2010 WL 4281892 (No. 2:10cr56), 2010 WL 4786989; Verdict
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